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RETROACTIVITY AND THE FUTURE OF SEX OFFENDER 
REGISTRATION IN MARYLAND 
 




aryland’s statutory sex offender registration scheme2 requires certain 
convicted sex offenders3 residing in Maryland to register with the 
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (the Department), or 
to register with another law enforcement or correctional entity for certain 
lengths of time4 depending on the offense(s) for which they were convicted.5  
Among them are potentially “thousands of Maryland sex offenders”6 who have 
been required to register for offenses committed before the enactment of 
Maryland’s registration scheme.7  Retroactive application of sex offender 
registration schemes like Maryland’s, under the direction of the federal Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA),8 has prompted a variety 
of ex post facto challenges nationwide including challenges on federal and 
state constitutional grounds.9   
                                                                                                                             
1 J.D., University of Baltimore School of Law.   
2 See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 11-701 to -727 (2013). 
3 See id. § 11-704.  Certain adjudicated juvenile sex offenders are also required to 
register with the Department; however, the nuances of the juvenile sex offender 
registry are outside the scope of this comment. 
4 Id. § 11-707. 
5 See id. § 11-701(o)-(q) (identifying that sexual offenses are assigned to one of three 
“tiers”);  see also infra note 42 and accompanying text.  
6 Appellant’s Pet. for Writ of Cert.  9, Roe v. Maynard, 435 Md. 501, 79 A.3d 947 
(2013) [hereinafter State Certiorari Petition], decision reached on appeal by Dep't of 
Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Doe, 439 Md. 201, 94 A.3d 791 (2014).  Counsel for 
the Department later reported the number of offenders in this retroactive class as 
1,250 during oral argument on May 6, 2014. 
7 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-702.1(a).  Maryland’s first sex offender 
registration scheme was originally enacted in 1995 and applied prospectively only.  
See 1995 Md. Laws, Ch. 142 (codified at Art. 27, § 692B). The statute's successor 
required certain offenders convicted of identified sex offenses on or after October 1, 
1995, for offenses committed before that date to register.  See 2001 Md. Laws, Ch. 
221 (later codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-702.1); 2009 Md. Laws, 
Ch. 541 (later codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-702.1); 2010 Md. 
Laws, Ch. 175 (later codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-702.1).   
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16929 (2013). 
9 See William M. Howard, Annotation, Validity of State Sex Offender Registration 
Laws Under Ex Post Facto Prohibitions, 63 A.L.R. 6th 351 (2011). 
M    
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     A plurality of the Court of Appeals of Maryland sustained an ex post facto 
challenge to Maryland’s statutory retroactive registration requirement on state 
constitutional grounds10 in Doe v. Department of Public Safety and 
Correctional Services.11  In Doe I, the court joined other states12 in 
contravening the Supreme Court’s analysis and conclusion on an identical 
issue in Smith v. Doe,13 which held that Alaska’s retroactive sex offender 
registration statute did not constitute punishment sufficient to sustain a 
challenge under the ex post facto clause of the federal Constitution.14  The 
court of appeals held in Doe I that the application and consequences of 
Maryland’s retroactive registration requirement constituted an impermissible 
ex post facto punishment prohibited by Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights.15 
     This comment will analyze the effect of two recent landmark court of 
appeals rulings on Maryland’s ex post facto jurisprudence, focusing on the 
legality and propriety of the State’s retroactive sex offender registration 
requirements under the encouragement of federal SORNA registration 
standards.  Part I discusses the statutory development of Maryland’s sex 
offender registration law in the context of the federal standards and provides 
an overview of pertinent ex post facto case law.  It further discusses two 
Maryland cases that sparked the ex post facto controversy with respect to 
retroactive sex offender registration obligations.  Part II outlines problems 
created in the wake of the Doe plurality holding, including a potential wave of 
challenges by registrants convicted before the enactment of Maryland’s law, 
the challenges faced by the State in pursuit of certain federal grant funding, 
and subsequent appellate dispute16 before the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
regarding the interplay between federal and state sex offender registration 
laws.  Part III proposes a possible solution that would result in an equitable 
balance between public safety, fiscal responsibility, and effective sex offender 






                                                                                                                             
10 See infra Part I.d. 
11 430 Md. 535, 62 A.3d 123 (2013) (hereinafter Doe I). 
12 See discussion infra Part I.e. 
13 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
14 Id. at 105-06. 
15 Doe I, 430 Md. at 568, 62 A.3d at 143.  
16 The recent consolidated opinion in Department of Public Safety and Correctional 
Services v. Doe and Hershberger v. Roe is the culminating Court of Appeals of 
Maryland decision on retroactive sex offender registration in Maryland.  See Dept. of 
Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs. v. Doe, 439 Md. 201, 94 A.3d 791 (2014) (hereinafter 
Doe II); see also infra note 143.   
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     Congress originally established national standards for sex offender 
registration in 1994 by passing the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children 
and Sexually Violent Offender Act.17  The Wetterling Act conditions a portion 
of federal law enforcement grant funding to states on their adoption and 
enactment of registration laws based upon the minimum federal standards.18  
Following substantial amendments to the Wetterling Act, the Attorney General 
was tasked with issuing guidelines and regulations to interpret the current 
iteration of the federal statute.19  The federal act is now known as Title I of the 
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).20   
     Sex offender registration and notification programs in the United States, 
according to the Attorney General, serve important public safety purposes.  
They include tracking sex offenders following their release into the 
community and providing broad notice to the public and law enforcement of 
their whereabouts.21  SORNA sought to “close potential gaps and loopholes” 
caused by “piecemeal amendments” to the existing federal standards, and to 
“strengthen the nationwide network of sex offender registration and 
notification programs.”22  At the time the final guidelines were promulgated, 
each state and the District of Columbia had passed sex offender registration 
laws.23 
     The Maryland General Assembly enacted the state’s first sex offender 
registration statute in 1995.24  The law was prompted both by the 1994 
                                                                                                                             
17 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071-14073, repealed by Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety 
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, tit. I, § 129(a), 120 Stat. 600 (2006); see also 
National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 
38030, 38045 (Jul. 2, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Guidelines], available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2008-07-02/pdf/E8-14656.pdf; Doe II, 439 Md. at 
222 n.12, 94 A.3d at 803 n.12. 
18 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 89-90; 42 U.S.C. § 16925(d). 
19 42 U.S.C. § 16912(b) (2013). 
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16929 (2013); Doe II, 439 Md. at 222, 94 A.3d at 803.  The 
full extent of the revision of both the federal standards and Maryland’s statutes is 
beyond the scope of this comment.  This comment will focus on the evolution of 
Maryland’s statute to apply retroactively to offenders convicted before the enactment 
of each.  
21 2008 Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38044-45. 
22 Id. at 38045; see also Doe II, 439 Md. at 222-23, 94 A.3d at 803. 
23 2008 Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38044; see also Sarah Tofte, No Easy Answers: 
Sex Offender Laws in the US, 19 No.4(G) HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2, 48 (2007). 
24 Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 336-37, 772 A.2d 1225, 1230 (2001) (citing 1995 
Md. Laws, Ch. 142). 
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Wetterling Act and in part by public outrage over the sexual assault of a young 
Dundalk child in the summer of 1993.25  The child victim and his parents 
became aware of the convicted molester’s release only by observing him in 
their community after having been released from prison earlier than 
expected.26  At its inception and in an effort to notify the surrounding 
community of the offender’s presence, the Maryland statute was only applied 
prospectively, requiring certain sex offenders to notify law enforcement of 
their presence in the county where he or she intended to live once released.27  
Meanwhile, the federal standards have undergone significant revision.28   
 
B. Retroactive Registration in Maryland: How We Got Here 
 
     SORNA delegates authority to the U.S. Attorney General29 “to specify the 
applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted 
before the enactment of this chapter or its implementation in a particular 
jurisdiction . . . .”30  In 2007, the Attorney General published an interim rule 
specifying that SORNA applies retroactively and requires implementing 
jurisdictions to subject sex offenders convicted before the enactment of 
SORNA to its registration and public notification requirements and to modify 
their programs accordingly to remain compliant with the federal standards.31  
In 2008 the Department of Justice published the Attorney General’s final 
guidelines, which reinforced the retroactivity requirements outlined in the 
                                                                                                                             
25 Gregory G. Gillette, The Maryland Survey: 1994-1995: Recent Developments: The 
Maryland General Assembly, 55 MD. L. REV. 847, 852 (1996) (The current iteration 
of the federal statute expressly states its purpose to respond to “vicious attacks by 
violent predators” against several children and adults including Jacob Wetterling, 
abducted at age 11 in 1989.); 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2013). 
26 Gillette, supra note 25, at 852. 
27 Graves, 364 Md. at 337, 772 A.2d at 1230; see also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
PROC.§ 11-702.1(a) (2013). 
28 2008 Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38030. 
29 All references herein to the Attorney General refer to the Attorney General of the 
United States. 
30 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (2006) (the federal Act facially applies directly to sex 
offenders nationwide); see also Doe II, 439 Md. 201, 223, 94 A.3d 791, 804; infra 
Part II for a discussion of federalism, statutory construction, and SORNA’s 
interaction with state law. 
31 Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 
8894-01 (February 28, 2007) (later codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 72) (The Attorney 
General’s requirements as they relate to implementing jurisdictions are “only 
conditions required to avoid the reduction in Federal funding under [SORNA].”); see 
also Doe II, 439 Md. at 223, 94 A.3d at 804 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 16925(d)). 
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interim rule.32  Citing the 2003 holding in Smith v. Doe,33 the Attorney General 
noted that the application of the SORNA standards to sex offenders whose 
convictions predate SORNA creates no ex post facto problem: 
 
[B]ecause the SORNA sex offender registration and 
notification requirements are intended to be non-punitive, 
regulatory measures adopted for public safety purposes, and 
hence may validly be applied (and enforced by criminal 
sanctions34) against sex offenders whose predicate 
convictions occurred prior to the creation of these 
requirements.35   
 
     Despite the Attorney General’s narrowing of the retroactive class via 
supplemental guidelines in 2011,36 the apparent precedent keeping pre-
SORNA offenders within its reach is the Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith v. 
Doe.37     
     Maryland, like seventeen other states and several tribal jurisdictions and 
territories, has “substantially implemented” SORNA’s requirements in its 
existing sex offender tracking program.38  Accordingly, Maryland’s sex 
offender registration and notification statutes have also undergone a number 
                                                                                                                             
32 The 2008 Guidelines state: 
 
The applicability of the SORNA requirements is not limited to sex 
offenders whose predicate sex offense convictions occur following 
a jurisdiction’s implementation of a conforming registration 
program.  Rather, SORNA’s requirements took effect when 
SORNA was enacted on July 27, 2006, and they have applied 
since that time to all sex offenders, including those whose 
convictions predate SORNA’s enactment.  
 
2008 Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38046. 
33 538 U.S. at 85. 
34 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006) (subjecting those convicted of a SORNA sex offense 
to a fine, imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both for failing to register with the 
destination jurisdiction as required by SORNA when traveling in interstate or foreign 
commerce).  Failure to register occurring after SORNA’s enactment and the effective 
date of the regulation indicates that SORNA applies to all sex offenders.  See U.S. v. 
Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 2010).     
35 2008 Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38046 (citing 72 Fed. Reg. 8894-01, 8896; 
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2013)). 
36 76 Fed. Reg. 1630-01, 1630, 1639 (Jan. 11, 2011). 
37 538 U.S. 84 (2003); see also supra text accompanying notes 13-14. 
38 Doe II, 439 Md. 201, 224, 62 A.3d 791, 804. 
2015] Retroactivity and the Future of Sex Offender Registration  
 
169 
of significant revisions to remain compliant with SORNA’s requirements in 
pursuit of federal grant funds.39     
     In 1999, the General Assembly substantially modified Maryland’s 
registration statute, retroactively subjecting certain categories of sex offenders 
to lifetime registration.40  Again in 2009, further revisions retroactively 
required certain sex offenders committing their offenses prior to October 1, 
1995, and convicted on or after that date, who were not previously required to 
register under Maryland law, to register as sex offenders.41  In 2010, further 
amendments adopted SORNA’s tiered offender classification structure, 
retroactively increasing the registration obligation of those offenders newly 
classified as tier-III offenders to lifetime registration.42   
     Angel Ochoa is one Maryland offender who, in 2013, sought declaratory 
relief after his ten-year post-conviction registration obligation was converted 
to a lifetime registration obligation pursuant to revisions of Maryland’s 
statue.43  A majority of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Ochoa applied 
the heavily revised Maryland registration statute, holding that Ochoa was 
subject to lifetime registration pursuant to those revisions despite having 
satisfied the previous statutorily imposed ten-year registration requirement.44  
The majority’s straightforward statutory interpretation and application 
eschewed any ex post facto analysis.45  Chief Judge Bell’s dissent criticized 
the statutory revisions, which have subtly evolved to recapture Maryland 
offenders convicted prior to SORNA’s existence, as obfuscated.46  The Ochoa 
case illustrates Maryland’s statutory evolution leading to the recent ex post 
facto legal bottleneck faced by Maryland lawmakers and regulators today.47        
 
                                                                                                                             
39 See, e.g., Fiscal Note to S.B. 73, 413th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 2 (Md. 1999), 
available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/1999rs/fnotes/bil_0003 
/sb0073.pdf (S.B. 73 was later enacted as 1999 Md. Laws, ch. 317); see also Doe I, 
430 Md. 535, 545-46, 62 A.3d 123, 129 (providing background on the evolution of 
Maryland's sex offender registration laws). 
40 1999 Md. Laws, ch. 317, art. 27(D)(2); see also Ochoa v. Dept. of Pub. Safety and 
Corr. Servs., 430 Md. 315, 319-21, 61 A.3d 1, 3-4 (2013). 
41 2009 Md. Laws, ch. 541, § 2(a)(5); Doe I, 430 Md. at 545-46, 62 A.3d at 129; Doe 
II, 439 Md. at 223, 62 A.3d at 804.  
42 2010 Md. Laws, ch. 174-75; Doe I, 430 Md. at 541, 62 A.3d at 126; Doe II, 439 
Md. at 223, 94 A.3d at 804. 
43 Ochoa, 430 Md. at 316, 61 A.3d at 1-2.   
44 Id. at 316-17, 61 A.3d at 2. 
45 Id.  The issue on which Ochoa appealed did not contemplate an ex post facto 
challenge.  
46 See id. at 340, (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (“An individual in the petitioner’s petition, 
looking to all these statutes, at best, would have a very difficult time ascertaining the 
current status of his registration obligation. . . .  It is simply unfair for this Court to 
hold the petitioner responsible for deciphering the complicated and often inscrutable 
history of Maryland’s sex offender registration laws.”).  
47 See infra Part II. 
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C. The Ex Post Facto Prohibition 
 
     Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides “[t]hat 
retrospective Laws, punishing acts committed before the existence of such 
Laws, and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust and 
incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto Law ought to be made; 
or any retrospective oath or restriction be imposed, or required.”48  The 
United States Constitution prohibits states from “pass[ing] any Bill of 
Attainder [or] ex post facto Law.”49  The juxtaposition is important because as 
is the case in Maryland, criminal defendants may be afforded broader 
protections under individual states’ constitutions.50  
     Justice Chase in 1798 endeavored to interpret the federal Constitution’s ex 
post facto prohibition:   
 
Laws considered ex post facto laws, within the words and the 
intent of the prohibition, include: (1) Every law that makes an 
action, done before the passing of the law, and which was 
innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.  (2) 
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it 
was, when committed.   (3) Every law that changes the 
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law 
annexed to the crime, when committed.  (4) Every law that 
alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or 
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the 
commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender.51   
 
. . . . 
 
[But] [e]very ex post facto law must necessarily be 
retrospective; but every retrospective law is not an ex post 
facto law: The former, only, are prohibited. . . . [T]here are 
cases in which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the 
community, and also of individuals, relate to a time 
antecedent to their commencement; as statutes of oblivion, or 
of pardon.52   
                                                                                                                             
48 MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 17 (emphasis added).  
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
50 See Doe I, 430 Md. 535, 548-49, 62 A.3d 123, 131; Doe II, 439 Md. 201, 235, 94 
A.3d 791, 811; see also infra note 68 and accompanying text. 
51 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798). 
52 Id. at 391.  Justice Chase relied in part on Maryland’s Constitution in making his 
opinion.  The Court of Appeals of Maryland has also determined that “not every law 
passed after the commission of an offense, which changes the consequences of that 
offense, is barred by the ex post facto provision.”  Doe I, 430 Md. at 560-61, 62 A.3d 
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Justice Chase also noted that the Supreme Court of the United States “has no 
jurisdiction to determine that any law of any state legislature, contrary to the 
Constitution of such state, is void.”53  Maryland’s ex post facto clause, like its 
federal equivalent, has been interpreted to apply only to criminal laws.54 
 
D. Doe and Ex Post Facto Interpretation in Maryland 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland has historically interpreted the state’s 
constitutional ex post facto prohibition in pari materia with that of the Federal 
Constitution, and has in the past held that the clauses have the same meaning.55  
Almost 100 years after Calder, the court in 1987 adopted the “disadvantage” 
standard in analyzing a federal ex post facto issue.56  By that standard the ex 
post facto “prohibition ‘extends broadly to any law passed after the 
commission of an offense which . . . in relation to that offense, or its 
consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage . . . .’”57   
     The Supreme Court abandoned this standard in 1990 by expressly 
overruling Kring in Collins v. Youngblood.58  In Collins, the Supreme Court 
returned to analyzing ex post facto problems within the confines of Calder’s 
four elements.59  Then in 2003, in the context of SORNA-inspired retroactive 
state sex offender registration analyzed under the Federal Constitution’s ex 
post facto prohibition, the Supreme Court in Smith employed a two-part intent-
effects test to hold that Alaska’s retroactive sex offender registration statute 
did not violate the Federal Constitution’s ex post facto prohibition.60  The issue 
                                                                                                                             
at 138 (quoting Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 310 Md. 217, 226, 
528 A.2d 904, 909 (1987)).    
53 Calder, 3 U.S. at 392. 
54 Doe I, 430 Md. at 553-54, 62 A.3d at 134 (quoting Anderson, 310 Md. at 223, 528 
A.2d at 907).   
55 See Sec’y, Dept. of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs. v. Demby, 390 Md. 580, 608, 890 
A.2d 310, 327 (2006); Doe I, 430 Md. at 548, 62 A.3d at 130-31.  The court departs 
from this interpretation in Doe I.  See Doe I, 430 Md. at 551, 62 A.3d at 132. 
56 Doe I, 430 Md. at 554, 62 A.3d at 134 (citing Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 
235 (1883), overruled by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) (standard 
adopted in Anderson, 310 Md. at 224, 528 A.2d at 908). 
57 Id. at 554, 62 A.3d at 134 (emphasis in original) (quoting Anderson, 310 Md. at 
224, 528 A.2d at 908).  
58 497 U.S. 37, 50 (1990); see also Doe I, 430 Md. at 581, 62 A.3d at 150 (Barbera, 
J., dissenting). 
59 Collins, 497 U.S. at 50; see also supra text accompanying notes 51-52. 
60 Doe I, 430 Md. at 556-57, 62 A.3d at 135-36, (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 
(2003)).  The Supreme Court utilized seven factors in its ex post facto analysis: 
whether the regulatory scheme has been regarded as punishment in the nation’s 
history and traditions; whether the scheme subjects respondents to affirmative 
disability or restraint; whether it promotes traditional aims of punishment; whether it 
has a rational connection to a legitimate non-punitive objective; whether the scheme 
is not excessive with respect to its purpose; whether a finding of scienter is required 
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of sex offender registration retroactivity was one of first impression in Smith, 
and the opinion is widely cited.61 
     The intent-effects test in Smith sought to “ascertain whether the legislature 
meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.”62   
 
If the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil 
and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the 
statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as 
to negate [the State’s] intention to deem it civil . . . [O]nly the 
clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and 
transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a 
criminal penalty.63 
 
     Despite Maryland’s traditional interpretation of its constitution’s ex post 
facto prohibition in pari materia with federal ex post facto jurisprudence,64 a 
divided Court of Appeals of Maryland in a plurality opinion in Doe I65 refused 
to unanimously apply the intent-effects test and instead retained the 
disadvantage standard in deciding that Mr. Doe could not, under Maryland’s 
constitution, be required to register as a sex offender pursuant to the retroactive 
provision in Maryland’s sex offender registration statute.66  Judge Greene, 
invoking a rule articulated in Dua v. Comcast Cable of Maryland, Inc.,67 noted 
that while the Court of Appeals of Maryland has generally interpreted its 
constitutional ex post facto provision in pari materia with the federal 
Constitution, the federal interpretation is merely persuasive and the court’s 
interpretation of Maryland’s constitution is not thereby limited.68 
                                                                                                                             
to trigger its operation; and whether the behavior to which it applies is already a 
crime.  Smith, 538 U.S. at 86-87 (citations omitted).   
61 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 92. 
62 Id. (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)). 
63 Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980) and Hudson v. 
United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997)) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
64 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
65 Doe I, 430 Md. 535, 62 A.3d 123. 
66 Id. at 551, 62 A.3d at 132-33.  The Department in its petition for certiorari in Roe 
pointed out that four out of seven judges on the Court of Appeals of Maryland (a 
majority) elected to utilize the federal intent-effects test.  Of them, two found that 
Maryland’s scheme was overly punitive in effect and two found that it was not, 
thereby creating no ex post facto problem.  The Court of Appeals in Doe II rejected 
the Department’s plea to reconsider the holding in Doe I on the basis that “the 
decision provides inadequate guidance to the lower courts . . . [and that] there is no 
single rationale that commanded a majority of the judges in Doe I . . . .”  Doe II, 439 
Md. at 218, 94 A.3d at 801. 
67 370 Md. 604, 621, 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (2002). 
68 Doe I, 430 Md. at 549, 62 A.3d at 131.  Judge Greene noted that Maryland’s 
Constitutional ex post facto protections may be broader than those of the federal 
Constitution and that the Supreme Court has sanctioned broader interpretations of 
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     The 2013 Court of Appeals of Maryland plurality decision in Doe I marks 
a departure from the court’s consistent interpretation of Maryland’s ex post 
facto prohibition in pari materia with the federal Constitution.69  Mr. Doe70 
pled guilty to, and was convicted of, one count of child sexual abuse for his 
inappropriate conduct with a thirteen-year-old student that occurred during the 
1983-84 school year while he was employed at the school as a teacher.71  The 
conviction, however, did not occur until the victim ultimately came forward in 
2006, after the initial enactment of Maryland’s first sex offender registration 
scheme.72  Although the plea agreement itself did not expressly contemplate 
Doe’s registration as a sex offender,73 he was required to register pursuant to 
the then-existing statute as a condition of his three-year supervised probation 
following release from his four and one-half year unsuspended prison term.74  
Mr. Doe, however, successfully challenged the portion of his sentence 
requiring registration as a sex offender because he did not meet the then-
existing express statutory conditions requiring registration at the time of his 
conviction.75 
     Approximately five months after Mr. Doe’s release from prison in 2008, 
Governor O’Malley signed Senate Bill 425 into law, which modified the 
statute’s retroactivity provision and required him to register as a child sex 
offender.76  Mr. Doe registered under protest pursuant to his probation officer’s 
                                                                                                                             
such states.  Id. at 550, 62 A.3d at 131-32 n.13 (citing William J. Brennan Jr., State 
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977)); 
see also Doe II, 439 Md. at 235, 94 A.3d at 811 (“Marylanders, like Hoosiers, enjoy 
‘greater protection under the prohibition on ex post facto laws’ of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights.”) (citing Andrews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 494, 502 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2012)). 
69 See supra text accompanying notes 64-66. 
70 John Doe is a pseudonym used in these cases after the offender had his name 
stricken from the record.  See Doe I, 430 Md. at 538, 62 A.3d at 124 n.3. 
71 Id.  Doe II provides an additional overview of the facts and procedural history in 
Mr. Doe’s and Mr. Roe’s cases.  Doe II, 439 Md. at 208-14, 94 A.3d at 795-98.   
72 Doe I, 430 Md. at 538, 62 A.3d at 125. See also supra note 24 and accompanying 
text.  
73 Doe I, 430 Md. at 539, 62 A.3d at 125.  For purposes of Maryland’s registration 
obligation, a guilty plea qualifies as a conviction, without any other statutory 
mention of the effect of a guilty plea on the obligation.  See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
PROC. § 11-702 (2013). 
74 Doe I, 430 Md. at 539-40, 62 A.3d at 125. 
75 Id. at 540, 62 A.3d at 125-26.  
76 Id. at 540, 62 A.3d at 126.  “The Department shall contact and notify each person 
who is not under the custody or supervision of a supervising authority on October 1, 
2009, for whom registration is required under . . . this subsection.”  2009 Md. Laws, 
ch. 541 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-707(c)(2)).  The passage of 
this amendment undoubtedly blindsided many convicted sex offenders not 
previously required to register. 
 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 45.2 
 
174 
direction, “under threat of ‘arrest[] and incarcerat[ion] . . . .’”77  Later in 2009, 
Mr. Doe filed a civil complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that he was not 
required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Maryland’s SORNA-inspired 
statute.78  Not until after the trial court denied Mr. Doe’s complaint for 
declaratory relief, in part for lack of an ex post facto problem, did he raise that 
issue on appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.79  The court of special appeals 
affirmed the trial court’s decision in an unreported opinion80 and the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland issued a writ of certiorari to consider, inter alia, the 
federal and state ex post facto prohibitions.81  
     Unlike in Ochoa, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Doe I considered 
whether Maryland’s registration statute constituted an ex post facto violation 
as applied to Mr. Doe.82  Judge Greene’s plurality opinion, however, resolved 
the issue solely on state constitutional grounds,83 definitively diverging from 
a reading of Article 17’s ex post facto prohibition in pari materia with that of 
the federal Constitution.84  The decision, while a victory for Mr. Doe and 
Maryland’s retroactively registered offenders, left much instability and 
uncertainty not only in the court’s ex post facto analysis, but also in the 
implementation of the State’s current retroactive sex offender statutes by the 
executive branch.85 
     Judge Greene, Judge Eldridge, and Chief Judge Bell held for the plurality 
in Doe I that “[b]ased upon principles of fundamental fairness and the right to 
fair warning within the meaning of Article 17, retrospective application of the 
                                                                                                                             
77 Doe I, 430 Md. at 540-41, 62 A.3d at 126. 
78 Id. at 541, 62 A.3d at 126.  Meanwhile, the Maryland General Assembly modified 
the registration statute again, categorizing Doe as a Tier-III lifetime registrant.  Id.  It 
is worth noting that Doe did not advance a constitutional ex post facto argument in 
his complaint; rather, it was the Department that argued the absence of an ex post 
facto violation during a hearing on the complaint, thereby preserving the issue for 
appeal.  Id. at 541-42, 543-44, 62 A.3d at 127-28. 
79 In addition to the ex post facto issue, Doe challenged the statute on bill of 
attainder, equal protection, and due process grounds.  Id. at 542, 62 A.3d at 127. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 542-43, 62 A.3d at 127. 
82 See Doe I, 430 Md. at 553, 62 A.3d at 133.   
83 See id. at 547, 62 A.3d at 130.  The plurality opinion by Judge Greene also 
represented the opinions of Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge (retired, specially 
assigned).  See id. at 578 n.1, 62 A.3d at 149 n.1 (Barbera, J., dissenting). 
84 Id. at 551, 553, 558, 62 A.3d at 132, 134, 137.  The salient effect of deciding the 
case on state constitutional grounds is the insulation from review by the Supreme 
Court, which would only decide the case on federal constitutional grounds.  See 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
85 State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 9. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae at 
17-22, Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 430 Md. 535, 62 A.3d 123 
(2013) (No. 125) 2012 WL 1969096, at *17-45 [hereinafter Amicus Brief] 
(providing a detailed history of Maryland’s Declaration of Rights Article 17 ex post 
facto prohibition).  
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sex offender registration statute to Petitioner is unconstitutional.”86  Judge 
Greene’s application of the disadvantage standard expressly relied in part on 
the brief of amici curiae, which outlined in detail the actual requirements of 
registrants and the multitude of adverse practical effects of registration.87  
These include requirements that the registrant register and report in person; 
disclose detailed private information; notify law enforcement with changes in 
e-mail addresses, phone numbers, mailing addresses, and school enrollment 
information; restrictions on the registrants’ travel and their ability to enter 
certain property; and widespread public dissemination of personal and private 
information on the Department’s website.88  These restrictions also impose 
substantial housing and employment problems on registrants and generate 
threats, which amount to punishment akin to public shaming.89  The court 
found that the retroactive sweep of the registration statute at the time of Mr. 
Doe’s conviction “had an effect that was the equivalent of placing Petitioner 
on probation for life as a result of his sex offense.”90      
     Furthermore, referencing Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Smith, Judge Greene 
agreed that the public dissemination of registrants’ information is “tantamount 
to the historical punishment of shaming[,]”91 suggesting that the Department’s 
placement of a searchable color picture of registrants along with detailed 
                                                                                                                             
86 Doe I, 430 Md. at 553, 62 A.3d at 133.  The holding renders MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. PROC. § 11-702.1 (Retroactive Application of Subtitle) unconstitutional on 
state grounds, thereby rendering § 11-704 (Persons Subject to Registration) 
prospective only. 
87 See id. at 566-67, 62 A.3d at 142; see also Amicus Brief, supra note 85 at 7-16.   
Regardless of whether the court utilized the disadvantage standard or the more 
deferential intent-effects test, five of seven judges on the court of appeals determined 
that Maryland’s registration scheme was overly punitive and violated Article 17 of 
Maryland’s Declaration of Rights. 
88 “These restrictions and obligations have the same practical effect of placing 
Petitioner on probation or parole.”  Doe I, 430 Md. at 562-63, 62 A.3d at 139 (citing 
Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 99, 1012 (Alaska 2008)).   
89 See Amicus Brief, supra note 85 at 7-16.  The Department of Public Safety and 
Correctional Services’ website provides the following warning on its search results 
page:  “Warning – Do not use this information to unlawfully injure, harass, or 
commit a crime against any individual named in the registry or residing or working 
at any reported address. Such action could result in civil or criminal penalties.”  
DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY AND CORR. SERV., Maryland SOR Search, 
www.dpscs.state.md.us/sorSearch/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2013).  The warning does 
not appear until a search or browse is conducted.  See Tofte, supra note 23, for a 
comprehensive report of the purported adverse effects imposed on registrants. 
90 Doe I, 430 Md. at 564, 62 A.3d at 140. 
91 Id. at 564-66, 62 A.3d at 140-41 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 116 (2003) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
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information including an icon on a map marking the offender’s home rises to 
the level of shunning the offender within their community.92   
     Judges McDonald and Adkins concurred in the result, instead by reading 
Article 17 in pari materia with the federal Constitution’s ex post facto 
prohibition.93  Finding “no principled reason” to “differentiat[e] [Article 17’s] 
prohibition against ex post facto laws from the parallel prohibition in the 
Federal Constitution[,]”94 Judge McDonald opined that the 2009 and 2010 
amendments to Maryland’s sex offender registry implicates the effects prong 
of the federal intent-effects test by “t[aking the] law across the line from civil 
regulation to an element of the punishment of offenders.”95 
     In her dissent, Judge Barbera agreed that Maryland’s Article 17 should be 
read in pari materia with the federal Constitution, but believed that Mr. Doe 
did not meet the clearest proof burden, set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Smith’s intent-effects test.96  Under that analysis, Judge Barbera would have 
held that Maryland’s registration statute does not “override legislative intent 
and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal 
penalty.”97  Judge Barbera determined that the legislature did not intend the 
2009 and 2010 amendments to be punitive, but rather to serve “public safety, 
regulatory ends,” and that no ex post facto problem existed.98  
     Although Judge Harrell did not agree with the plurality analysis, he 
nonetheless concurred in the result, sealing a 6-1 vote in favor of Mr. Doe.99  
Judge Harrell would have ordered specific performance of Mr. Doe’s 2006 
plea agreement, which did not include registering as a sex offender, pursuant 
to the procedural safeguards underlying Maryland Rule 4-243100 and the rule 
                                                                                                                             
92 Id. at 566, 62 A.3d at 141-42. Judge Greene noted that the public display of the 
registrants’ address and other information, allowing members of the registrants’ 
communities in which they live, work, or attend school, impermissibly resembles 
shaming for purposes of Maryland’s ex post facto prohibition.  Id. at 568, 62 A.3d at 
142-43. 
93 See id. at 577-78, 62 A.3d at 148-49 (McDonald, J., concurring). 
94 Id.  
95 Doe I, 430 Md. at 577-78, 62 A.3d at 148-49 (McDonald, J., concurring)    
96 Id. at 586, 62 A.3d at 154 (Barbera, J., dissenting).  Judge Barbera became Chief 
Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in July 2013. 
97 Id. (Barbera, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)) (noting 
that the plurality opinion did not even establish the threshold requirement in any ex 
post facto violation that Maryland’s registration statute is a “criminal or penal law”). 
98 Id. at 587, 62 A.3d at 154. (Barbera, J., dissenting).  Judge Barbera also provided 
authority interpreting SORNA’s civil, regulatory purpose at the federal level, noting 
extensive failure of ex post facto challenges to SORNA in federal courts.  Id. at 589, 
62 A.3d at 155 (Barbera, J., dissenting).  
99 Doe I, 430 Md. at 569, 62 A.3d at 143 (Harrell, J., concurring). 
100 Id. at 576, 62 A.2d at 147 (Harrell, J., concurring) (citing Cuffley v. State, 416 
Md. 568, 580-81, 7 A.3d 557, 563-65 (2010)) (referencing the four corners of the 
plea agreement approach). 
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of lenity.101  Although concurring in the result on this unique basis, Judge 
Harrell agreed with the dissent—Judges McDonald, Adkins, and Barbera—
that Maryland’s ex post facto prohibition should be read in pari materia with 
the federal Constitution, thus requiring the court to apply the more deferential 
intent-effects test.102  This opinion, though contemning the statutory operation 
of Maryland’s sex offender registration system in light of the plea agreement, 
formed a 4-3 majority agreement that Article 17 should be read in pari materia 
with the federal Constitution.103 
 
E. Other Courts’ Decisions on the Issue 
 
     State and federal appellate courts, including the Supreme Court of the 
United States, have repeatedly held that imposing restrictive measures on sex 
offenders adjudged to be dangerous is a legitimate nonpunitive government 
objective,104 and have rejected ex post facto claims by offenders required to 
register retroactively.105  For example, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld West Virginia’s registration and notification statute as civil and 
                                                                                                                             
101 Concurring in Doe I, Judge Harrell wrote: 
 
Determining the meaning of a sentencing term in a plea agreement 
requires strict adherence to the ‘four corners’ of the plea agreement 
as established in the Maryland Rule 4-243 plea proceeding and to 
‘due process concerns for fairness and adequacy of procedural 
safeguards.’ . . . Any ambiguities in the record concerning the 
agreement’s terms are resolved in the defendant’s favor.   
 
Doe I, 430 Md. at 576, 62 A.3d at 147 (Harrell, J., concurring) (quoting Cuffley, 416 
Md. at 580-81, 7 A.3d at 563-65). Judge Harrell reiterated his stance in a 
concurrence in Doe II. See Doe II, 439 Md. at 238, 94 A.3d at 813 (Harrell, J., 
concurring).   
102 Doe I, 430 Md. at 569, 62 A.3d at 143 (Harrell, J., concurring).  
103 See supra text accompanying notes 64-66. 
104 See e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997) (holding that prior 
criminal conduct serves solely an evidentiary purpose to demonstrate “mental 
abnormality” or to support a finding of future dangerousness to invoke involuntary 
commitment under Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act); see also Smith v. Doe, 
538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003) (holding that Alaska’s retroactive sex offender 
registration statute did not constitute punishment sufficient to sustain a challenge 
under the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution). 
105 See Howard, supra note 9. 
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nonpunitive in nature,106 following the lead of the state’s supreme court.107  
Numerous state courts have agreed with this analysis.108 
     It is clear that under Smith’s controlling precedent on the federal ex post 
facto issue, federal judges have little, if any, substantive leeway to grant relief 
to registrants in federal courts.109  However, just as there have been substantive 
losses for registrants challenging their sex offender registration obligation on 
ex post facto grounds in federal courts,110 there have been instances of 
procedural wins.111   
     State high courts, however, have both substantive and procedural leeway to 
strike down registration schemes offensive to their respective state 
constitutions.112  Alaska, Indiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Maine, Missouri, and 
Kentucky are included among other states that have declared their registry 
schemes to constitute ex post facto violations, independent of the federal 
constitutional provision, affording broader protection on state constitutional 
grounds as did a plurality of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Doe I.113   
     The Supreme Court of Alaska, notwithstanding the Supreme Court of the 
United States’ holding in Smith v. Doe and its concession that it has on several 
                                                                                                                             
106 Cunningham v. Lemmon, 251 Fed.Appx. 829, 830 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) 
(no ex post facto violation on federal constitutional grounds), aff’g Cunningham v. 
West Virginia, No. 6:06-cv-00169, 2007 WL 895866, at *7 (D. W. Va. Mar. 22, 
2007).  
107 See Haislop v. Edgell, 215 W.Va. 88, 95, 593 S.E.2d 839, 846 (2003) (no ex post 
facto violation on state constitutional grounds). 
108 See Howard, supra note 9. 
109 See Doe I, 430 Md. at 556-57, 62 A.3d 123, 135-36 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 
U.S. 84 (2003)); supra text accompanying note 60.  The analysis in Smith may, 
however, produce a different result where a registrant meets the “clearest proof” 
burden under registration schemes more punitive than Alaska’s. 
110 See, e.g., United States v. Shoulder, 738 F.3d 948, 958 (9th Cir. 2013) (criminal 
prosecution valid for failure to register retroactively under SORNA); United States v. 
Elkins, 683 F.3d 1039, 1045 n.7 (9th Cir. 2012) (Sixth Circuit citing authority for no 
ex post facto violation for pre-SORNA retroactive registration and Ninth Circuit 
holding same). 
111 See generally United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498 (3d Cir. 2013) (outlining 
circuit split on whether the Attorney General had good cause to bypass the 
Administrative Procedure Act notice and comment period on interim retroactivity 
rule, holding that he did not, thereby prejudicing plaintiff); United States v. 
Valverde, 628 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding the same). 
112 See Doe I, 430 Md. at 549, 62 A.3d at 131; supra text accompanying note 68. 
113 See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1003 (Alaska 2008) (utilizing federal intent-
effects test); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 378 (Ind. 2009) (utilizing federal 
intent-effects test); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1111 (Ohio 2011) (utilizing 
unique Ohio ex post facto test); Starkey v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004, 1019 
(Okla. 2013) (intent-effects test); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 16 (Me. 2009) 
(federal intent-effects test); Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. 2006) (utilizing 
state constitutional bar on “laws retrospective in operation”).     
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occasions followed the federal constitutional ex post facto analysis, later 
extended broader protection on state constitutional grounds where Alaska’s 
statutory scheme “treats offenders not much differently than the state treats 
probationers and parolees subject to continued state supervision.”114  The court 
ultimately held that the effects of the statute “are punitive, and convincingly 
outweigh the statute's nonpunitive purposes and effects.”115  Likewise, in 
Wallace, the Supreme Court of Indiana found that despite the Indiana 
legislature’s civil intent, the punitive effects of Indiana’s sex offender 
registration statute were particularly excessive.116  The Supreme Court of 
Ohio, utilizing an ex post facto test from the turn of the twentieth century, 
found that the punitive effect of the state’s sex offender registration statute 
impermissibly “takes away vested rights, affects an accrued substantive right, 
imposes new or additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a 
past transaction, or creates a new right.”117  
 
II. RESIDUAL DISPUTE AND THE PROBLEM IN MARYLAND TODAY  
 
     At the federal level, the current bottleneck in the retroactive operation of 
Maryland and other states’ sex offender registration statutes illustrates a 
problem for the Attorney General in applying SORNA retroactively as a 
national standard.118  Maryland is now among several states that have declared 
retroactive sex offender registration obligations unconstitutional as punitive 
based upon state ex post facto prohibitions.119  The decision initially opened 
the floodgates to challenges by offenders required to register because of 
antecedent convictions.  Serving to delay this result, the Department of Public 
Safety and Correctional Services, the administrator of Maryland’s sex offender 
registration system, initially resisted the decision of the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland in Doe I, and appellate litigation continued.120  
                                                                                                                             
114 Doe v. State, 189 P.3d at 1009.  The court applied the seven Mendoza-Martinez 
ex post facto factors applied in Smith, noting the intrusive practical effects of the 
scheme, which threatens prosecution for non-compliance.  See id. at 1008 (citing 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). 
115 Doe v. State, 189 P.3d at 1018. 
116 Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 384.  
117 Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 1110-11 (quoting Pratte v. Stewart, 929 N.E.2d 415, at 
37 (Ohio 2010)).  
118 Ostensibly, the Attorney General anticipated states’ ex post facto analyses to be 
consistent with the prevailing federal intent-effects analysis in all cases (an 
obviously flawed assumption).  See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text. 
119 See supra text accompanying note 113.  State constitutionality rulings, of course, 
inherently vary depending upon the various language in and interpretations of state 
constitutions and the degree of each states’ retroactive registration obligations, many 
of which have been inspired by the federal SORNA standards.   
120 See infra Part II.a-c. 
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     The residual problem in Maryland following Doe I was apparent in the form 
of a federalism problem in part and a statutory construction problem in part in 
Roe v. Maynard (Roe),121 and was a certified question of law in Doe II.122  
Following the plurality decision in Doe I,123 the Circuit Court for Washington 
County entered an order directing the Department of Public Safety and 
Correctional Services to remove Mr. Doe’s registration information from state 
and federal databases.124  The Department resisted this order, claiming that the 
court lacked authority to remove offender information from federal 
databases.125  The Department appealed the denial of its motion to alter or 
amend the order on that ground, and the court of special appeals certified that 
question to the Court of Appeals of Maryland pursuant to Rule 8-304.126  A 
similar question was raised in a separate case occurring at the same time as the 
Doe I litigation, and the matters were consolidated for argument in the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland in May 2014.127  
 
A. The Roe Case 
 
     John Roe was similarly affected by the 2009-10 amendments to Maryland’s 
registration statute as a result of a conviction in 1997, for offenses committed 
between late 1994 and early 1996.128  As a result of the amendments, Roe’s 
original ten-year registration obligation was retroactively converted into a 
twenty-five-year obligation under the new tier system.129  Roe filed a 
complaint for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court of Maryland for 
Wicomico County following the legislature’s passage of the 2009 
amendments.130  He challenged his retroactive registration obligation in part 
on federal and state ex post facto grounds, but the circuit court denied relief.131  
He appealed the denial to the court of special appeals, which ultimately 
reversed the circuit court pursuant to the Doe I plurality, holding that the 2009 
                                                                                                                             
121 Roe v. Maynard, 435 Md. 501, 79 A.3d 947 (2013).   
122 See Doe II, 439 Md. at 222, 94 A.3d 791, 803. 
123 See supra Part I.d. 
124 See Doe II, 439 Md. at 210, 94 A.3d at 796. 
125 Id. 
126 Id.; see also State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 3. 
127 The Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services successfully 
petitioned for certiorari in Roe in the Court of Appeals of Maryland shortly after Doe 
was decided. See infra Part II.c.  See also State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 
17.  
128 Doe II, 439 Md. at 211-12, 94 A.3d at 797. 
129 Id. at 212-13, 94 A.3d at 797-98 (If not for the 2010 amendment, the 2009 
amendment reclassifying Mr. Roe would have required him to register for life.). 
130 Id.  Roe had already spent 13 years as a registered sex offender.  See also Roe v. 
Maynard, 435 Md. 501, 79 A.3d 947 (2013). 
131 Doe II, 439 Md. at 212, 94 A.3d at 797. 
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and 2010 amendments could not be applied retroactively.132  The Department 
of Public Safety and Correctional Services then appealed from the subsequent 
order of the circuit court for Wicomico County that had ordered it, as it had in 
Doe I, to “remove any and all information regarding Roe from the Maryland 
Sex Offender Registry website [and] . . . remove Roe’s sex offender 
registration information from all federal databases including the NCIC . . . 
.”133  The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted the Department’s certiorari 
petition and consolidated the question for oral argument with that which was 
posed in Doe I134 to consider whether the circuit court had authority to direct 
the Department to remove Roe from databases maintained in compliance with 
federal law.135  
 
B. Doe’s Ex Post Facto Analysis is the Law of Maryland 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Doe II did not revisit the ex post facto 
analysis articulated by the Doe I plurality.136  The Department argued in its 
petition for certiorari that because the Doe I plurality relied upon the 
“disadvantage” analysis in reaching its result while two other judges on the 
court reached the same result in using the intent-effect analysis, Doe I “has 
generated uncertainty with regard to the registration obligations of thousands 
of Maryland sex offenders.”137  It further argued that Doe I should be 
reconsidered to bring Maryland in line with the Supreme Court’s result in 
Smith.138  Strength for this argument was apparent because a majority of the 
                                                                                                                             
132 Id. at 213, 94 A.3d at 798. 
133 Id.  The Circuit Court for Wicomico County did not address the Department’s 
motion for appropriate relief, seeking to have the court declare Roe’s registration 
obligation under federal law, prior to entering its order.  However, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland treated it as denied, making it a final, appealable order.  Id. at 
215, 94 A.3d at 799. 
134 Id. at 207 n.1, 94 A.3d at 794 n.1.   
135 Id. at 207, 94 A.3d at 794. 
136 Doe II, 439 Md. at 214 n.8, 94 A.3d at 798 n.8. 
137 State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 8-9.  Mr. Roe, in his response to the 
Department’s certiorari petition, called this a “back-door effort” on the part of the 
Department “to raise issues it failed to raise or preserve in Mr. Roe’s case . . . before 
the Circuit Court . . . .”  Appellee’s Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, 
Roe v. Maynard, 435 Md. 501, 79 A.3d 947 (2013) (No. 125), 2012 WL 3791643 
[hereinafter Roe Response]. 
138 State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 9-10.  The practical effect of this would 
have been to narrow the ex post facto protections under Maryland’s constitution 
despite Article 17’s broader language than the Federal constitution’s ex post facto 
prohibition.  By presenting a favorable question of federal law for review, the 
Department ostensibly strategized to persuade the Court of Appeals to reconsider 
Doe I in its favor.  The Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with the 
characterization of this as an attempt at “backdoor preemption” – the Department’s 
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judges that took part in the Doe I decision favored reading Article 17 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights in pari materia with the federal Constitution’s 
ex post facto prohibition using the intent-effects test.139  However, in granting 
certiorari in Roe and accepting the certified question in Doe I, the court limited 
its review in Doe II to the independent registration obligation under federal 
law and the Maryland courts’ ability to order removal of offenders from 
federal databases.140 The court did not accept the Department’s question of 
whether Maryland’s registration requirements are considered punishment for 
purposes of the federal and State ex post facto prohibitions.141   
 
C. The Independent Federal Registration Obligation: A Matter of 
Statutory Interpretation 
 
     The basis of the Department’s position following the Doe I plurality was 
that, irrespective of the constitutionality of Maryland’s sex offender 
registration statute, federal law imposes an independent obligation upon 
offenders to register in Maryland. Therefore, convicted offenders in Mr. Roe 
and Mr. Doe’s position must remain listed in “federal databases.”142  The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland addressed this argument head on in Doe II.143 The 
questions resolved by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Doe II included 
whether:  
 
In light of the requirement imposed by federal law that each 
state maintain an online registry of sex offenders residing in 
the state and the obligation imposed on convicted sex 
offenders by federal law to register in the state where they 
reside, . . . the circuit court lack[ed] authority to direct the 
State to remove Mr. Roe from databases maintained in 
                                                                                                                             
attempt at “us[ing] federal law to effectively override [its] decision in Doe I.”  See 
Doe II, 439 Md. at 221 n.11, 94 A.3d at 802 n.11. 
139 State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 9-10. 
140 Doe II, 439 Md. at 220-21, 94 A.3d at 802-03. 
141 Id. at 214 n.8, 94 A.3d at 798 n.8.  Though the Court did not grant certiorari 
regarding revisiting Doe, the Department did not fully abandon these arguments 
during oral argument.   
142 State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 17.  Federal law, the Department’s 
argument continued, precluded Maryland courts’ authority to order the Department 
to remove sex offender information from “federal databases.”  Doe II, 439 Md. at 
219-20, 94 A.3d at 802.      
143 Doe II, 439 Md. at 207, 94 A.3d at 794.  The Maynard v. Roe portion of the 
consolidated opinion was re-captioned as Hershberger v. Roe after Gregg 
Hershberger succeeded Gary Maynard as Secretary of the Maryland Department of 
Public Safety and Correctional Services. Id. at 207 n.1, 94 A.3d at 794 n.1. 
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compliance with federal law, irrespective of his challenge to 
registration requirements imposed by MD law?144   
 
The question was essentially the same in Doe I.145      
     The court of appeals in Doe II eschewed Mr. Roe’s constitutional 
arguments and resolved the issues solely by statutory interpretation.146  The 
court expressly declined the constitutional arguments, thereby limiting the 
grounds for its holding on the independent federal registration obligation 
issue.147           
     The Attorney General’s final guidelines provide guidance on sex offenders’ 
federal obligation:   
 
SORNA’s regulatory system for sex offenders involves a 
combination of federal and non-federal elements.  In part, 
SORNA directly prescribes registration requirements that sex 
offenders must comply with, and authorizes the Attorney 
General to augment or further specify those requirements in 
certain areas. . . . These requirements are subject to direct 
federal enforcement, including prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 
2250 where violations occur under circumstances supporting 
federal jurisdiction, and prescription of compliance with the 
SORNA requirements as mandatory conditions of supervision 
for federal sex offenders under 18 U.S.C. 3563(a)(8), 3583(d).  
SORNA provides incentives for states and other covered 
jurisdictions to incorporate its registration requirements for 
sex offenders, and other registration and notification-related 
measures set out in other provisions of SORNA, into their 
own sex offender registration notification programs.148 
 
                                                                                                                             
144 Id. at 214, 94 A.3d at 798. 
145 Id. at 211, 94 A.3d at 796.  The modified certified question considered in Doe II 
was whether “circuit courts have the authority to order the Department to remove sex 
offender registration information from ‘federal databases’?”  See id.  
146 Id. at 221-22, 94 A.3d at 802-03.  Mr. Roe argued that SORNA was merely an 
exercise of the Spending Clause to encourage states’ implementation of SORNA to 
avoid losing federal grant funds under the Edward R. Byrne Justice Assistance 
Grant.  See Roe Response, supra note 137, at 18-22.  He further argued that any 
federal government regulation of Maryland’s sex offender registration system clearly 
exceeds Congress’ commerce power and that Congress cannot compel Mr. Roe to 
register in Maryland as a sex offender notwithstanding the Doe plurality holding.  
Doe II, 439 Md. at 220-21, 94 A.3d at 802-03. 
147 Doe II, 439 Md. at 221-22, 94 A.3d at 802-03.  
148 2008 Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38034. 
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     The Second Circuit interpreted the independent federal registration 
obligation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a)149 in United States v. Guzman.150  
Guzman involved federal criminal enforcement of offenders who failed to 
register, then subsequently traveled in interstate commerce.151  In Guzman, the 
court acknowledged that “according to [section 2250’s] explicit terms, a sex 
offender who never crosses state lines . . . cannot be criminally liable [under 
section 2250] for failure to comply with SORNA.”152  The Fourth Circuit 
rejected another Commerce Clause challenge to SORNA enforcement in 
United States v. Gould,153 upholding a Maryland sex offender’s federal 
                                                                                                                             
149 Section 16913(a) provides: 
 
A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each 
jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, 
and where the offender is a student. For initial registration purposes only, a 
sex offender shall also register in the jurisdiction in which convicted if such 
jurisdiction is different from the jurisdiction of residence. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) 
150 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied 561 U.S. 1019 (2010). 
151 Id.  The federal criminal enforcement provision provides:   
 
(a) In general. Whoever-- 
(1) is required to register under the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act; 
(2)  
(A) is a sex offender as defined for the purposes 
of the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act by reason of a conviction under 
Federal law (including the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice [10 USCS §§ 801 et seq.]), the 
law of the District of Columbia, Indian tribal 
law, or the law of any territory or possession of 
the United States; or 
(B) travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or 
enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian country; 
and 
(3) knowingly fails to register or update a registration as 
required by the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act; 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, 
or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006). 
152 Guzman, 591 F.3d at 90.  In so holding, the Second Circuit noted that it joined 
“every other circuit that has examined the issue in concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 
2250(a) is a legitimate exercise of congressional Commerce Clause authority.”  Id. 
(citations omitted). 
153 568 F.3d 459, 466 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied 559 U.S. 974 (2010). 
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conviction as a valid exercise of the federal government’s commerce power, 
and not an ex post facto violation where the defendant was convicted under 
section 2250 following an antecedent District of Columbia conviction and 
failure to register upon moving to Maryland.154  Gould clearly illustrates the 
operation of section 16913(a)’s mandate on offenders in the context of its 
criminal enforcement by section 2250(a), where federal jurisdiction exists. 
     However, Guzman and Gould can easily be distinguished from the issue 
before the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Doe II because neither Mr. Roe 
nor Mr. Doe had been convicted “under Federal law[], the law of the District 
of Columbia, Indian tribal law, or the law of any territory of possession of the 
United States . . . [,]” nor had they “travel[ed] in interstate or foreign 
commerce[,]” either of which would subject them to federal criminal liability 
for failure to register under section 2250.155  Moreover, as the court of appeals 
pointed out, these and other cases on which the Department relied serve to only 
affirm the notion that section 16913(a)’s mandate on individual offenders 
operated regardless of whether the state in which the offender was located had 
implemented SORNA.156  This was irrelevant to the resolution of the issues in 
Doe II.157 
     Despite the absence of facts to support federal jurisdiction for purposes of 
federal criminal enforcement in Roe or Doe I, Guzman and Gould do support 
the Department’s position that 42 U.S.C.A. § 16913(a) imposes a federal law 
obligation on sex offenders convicted in Maryland to register based upon their 
                                                                                                                             
154 Id.  This was even prior to Maryland’s implementation of SORNA standards. 
155 See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).  Mr. Roe also raised this point in his response to the 
Department’s certiorari petition in his case.  See Roe Response, supra note 137, at 8. 
156 Doe II, 439 Md. at 227-28, 94 A.3d at 807. 
157 The Doe II court stated: 
 
What the [Department] fails to recognize . . . is the distinguishing 
fact that in those federal cases, the purported obstacle to 
registration was that Maryland had not yet implemented SORNA.  
By contrast, here Appellees’ asserted stumbling block is that this 
Court has declared the retroactive application of Maryland’s sex 
offender registry to be unconstitutional under the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights.”  Id.  “[A]lthough . . . SORNA creates a 
direct obligation on sex offenders to register in their home state, 
independent of that State’s implementation of SORNA, the state 
need not accept the registration if doing so would be contrary to 
state law.  This is precisely the case here.  The [Department] 
cannot legally accept a sex offender’s involuntary registration 
when that individual’s registration is unconstitutional under 
Maryland law. 
 
Id. at 232, 94 A.3d at 809. 
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status as sex offenders set forth in 42 U.S.C.A. § 16911.158  The Department 
cited a decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri, which held that SORNA 
requires Missouri officials to maintain offenders on the state’s registry 
pursuant to section 16913 “irrespective of any allegedly retrospective state law 
that has been enacted and may be subject to [the Missouri constitution’s] ban 
on the enactment of retrospective state laws.”159  However, the Supreme Court 
of Missouri later qualified its holding in Keathley, explaining that SORNA’s 
independent registration obligation in section 16913(a) merely triggered the 
registration obligation by operation of Missouri statute, meaning that Missouri 
may require an offender to register based on section 16913(a)’s mandate 
without violating its state constitution.160 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected the Department’s preemption 
argument, noting that “the federal statute itself does not purport to ‘preempt 
the field’ of sex offender registration . . . [,]” and that the Attorney General’s 
regulations explain that SORNA does not preempt state sex offender 
registration schemes.161  Therefore, absent a constitutionally-valid, state-level 
criminal enforcement option, enforcement of this federal obligation is limited 
to circumstances supporting federal jurisdiction, including traveling in 
interstate commerce.162  It follows that a state could theoretically choose to 
eliminate its sex offender registration statutes entirely, leaving no enforcement 
option for failure to register under the federal mandate.163  Further, there can 
be no intrastate criminal enforcement of this independent retroactive federal 
obligation to register, provided that offenders in Mr. Roe’s and Mr. Doe’s 
                                                                                                                             
158 See Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 81849-01, at 
81850 (Dec. 29, 2000) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt.72) (“SORNA directly imposes 
registration obligations on sex offenders as a matter of federal law and provides for 
federal enforcement of these obligations under circumstances supporting federal 
jurisdiction.”); see also Doe II, 439 Md. at  227-28, 94 A.3d at 806-07. 
159 Doe v. Keathley, 290 S.W.3d 719, 720 (Mo. 2009) (necessitating the assumption 
that Missouri has a registry in the first place).  Missouri is of course, like any state, 
free to decide whether to maintain a sex offender registration program at all.  
Ostensibly on this basis, the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that “the federal 
statute itself does not purport to ‘preempt the field’ of sex offender registration . . .” 
Doe II, 439 Md. at 221 n.11, 94 A.3d at 802 n.11. 
160 Doe II, 439 Md. at 233, 94 A.3d at 810 (citing Doe v. Toelke, 389 S.W.3d 165, 
167 (Mo. 2012) (internal citations omitted)). 
161 Doe II, at 221 n.11, 94 A.3d at 802 n.11.  
162 See Roe Response, supra note 137 at 23-24 (citing Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 
438, 452 (2010)); see also Guzman, 591 F.3d at 90 (“[W]ithout § 2250, § 16913 
lacks federal criminal enforcement, and without § 16913, § 2250 has no substance.”).    
163 As a practical matter, SORNA’s independent obligation to register depends on a 
state’s enactment and implementation of a sex offender registry in the first place.  
Indeed, there would be no point in SORNA’s requirement that states adopt separate 
state-level criminal penalties for failure to register if the federal criminal liability for 
failure to register pursuant to SORNA could reach purely intrastate activity.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 16913(e) (2006). 
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situation do not subject themselves to federal criminal enforcement by 
traveling in interstate commerce or becoming convicted in a manner 
conferring federal jurisdiction.164 
     The Department further argued that:  
 
[P]recluding [offenders] from complying with [their] federal 
obligation to register in [their] place of residence under 42 
U.S.C. § 16913(a)[,] . . . frustrates the purpose of SORNA to 
protect children from child sex offenders and creates a 
situation where Maryland will become a ‘sanctuary state’ for 
child sex offenders attempting to escape the federal statute’s 
registration requirements.165   
 
It is now apparent that this policy argument carries weight only to the extent 
that Maryland offenders removed from the State’s registry pursuant to Doe I 
do not leave the state.  Any out-of-state offenders moving to Maryland in an 
attempt to avoid registration requirements will be subject to federal criminal 
liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2250.166   
     Whether or not the Department’s argument is true, the court of appeals did 
not reach this issue in Doe II.  The court of appeals read the SORNA statutory 
provisions as a whole167 to hold that, despite SORNA’s “independent federal 
registration obligation,” Maryland circuit courts are authorized to direct state 
officials to remove Maryland sex offender registrants from the State’s registry 
when the offenders were placed on the registry illegally under Doe I.168  This 
highlights the Department’s recent dilemma: relieve the State’s existing 
retroactive class as a whole from their existing registration requirements or 
evaluate each individual offender’s challenge in a wave of litigation following 
Doe I and Doe II? 
 
D. Substantial Implementation 
 
     Congress expressly contemplated state-level constitutionality problems, 
providing that the Attorney General, in the face of such a problem, must 
consult with the state’s chief executive and chief legal officer to determine 
“reasonable alternative procedures or accommodations . . . consistent with the 
purposes of this chapter” in determining whether the state has substantially 
implemented SORNA, thereby potentially preserving states’ entitlement to 
                                                                                                                             
164 See Guzman, 591 F.3d 83; supra text accompanying note 151. 
165 See State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 15. 
166 See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 464 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that a sex 
offenders’ registration obligation is not contingent upon SORNA implementation). 
167 See Doe II, 439 Md. at 229, 94 A.3d at 807 (citing Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1, 9, 
20 A.3d 801, 806 (2011)) (internal quotations omitted).   
168 Doe II, 439 Md. at 206, 231, 94 A.3d at 794, 808. 
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grant awards.169  The Attorney General, in implementing SORNA 
retroactively, expressly recognized the states’ authority to declare their 
SORNA-inspired registration statutes unconstitutional on state constitutional 
grounds, specifically as a result of the retroactivity aspect of the SORNA 
guidelines.170  However, in response to comments he received on SORNA’s 
retroactivity, the Attorney General ostensibly anticipated no ex post facto 
problems based upon the Supreme Court’s determination in Smith v. Doe in 
stating, perhaps not controversially at the time, that:  
 
[A]s non-punitive regulatory measures, the SORNA 
requirements do not implicate the Constitution's prohibition 
of ex post facto laws.  Moreover, fairness does not require that 
an offender, at the time he acknowledges his commission of 
the crime and pleads guilty, be able to anticipate all future 
regulatory measures that may be adopted in relation to persons 
like him for public safety purposes.171   
 
     Given that section 16925 expressly contemplates a mechanism to preserve 
states’ substantial implementation in the face of state constitutionality 
problems, it is not the case, as the Department argued, that “these federal 
obligations operate independently of state law and of any judicial 
determination that state law registration requirements cannot be applied to Mr. 
Roe.”172 
     Therefore, it is clearly the case that Maryland’s obligation to “maintain 
[individuals] on its sex offender registry” only affects substantial 
implementation of SORNA and its attendant retention of federal grant funds 
in support of SORNA’s purpose to bolster nationwide network of 
registrants.173  Having considered the issue of offenders’ independent federal 
                                                                                                                             
169 Id. at 230, 94 A.3d at 808 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 16925 (b)).   
170 See 2008 Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38036. 
171 Id. This certainly conflicts with the policy rationale underlying plea agreements.  
See Doe I, 430 Md. at 576, 62 A.3d at 147; supra text accompanying note 101. 
172  State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 17; see also Doe II, 439 Md. at 231, 94 
A.3d at 808 (“To arrive at the [Department]’s proposed interpretation of the statute – 
that Appellees must register in Maryland even if doing so violates their rights under 
Maryland’s constitution – would render SORNA § 125, 42 U.S.C. § 16925, useless 
surplusage.”). 
173 See Doe II, 439 Md. at 223, 94 A.3d at 804 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 16925(d)); see 
also supra note 22 and accompanying text; Roe Response, supra note 137, at 18-26; 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Sex Offender Registration and Notification in the 
United States: Current Case Law and Issues, at 6 n.32 (Sept. 2014), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/caselaw/handbook_july2012.pdf (“Federal courts 
have interpreted SORNA as directly imposing a duty on a person to attempt to 
register if they meet the definition of ‘sex offender’ under SORNA.  [But,] there will 
be situations where . . . the jurisdiction where that offender lives . . . refuses to 
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obligation to register pursuant to SORNA’s express terms and states’ 
obligations to substantially implement SORNA’s standards only to avoid 
federal grant funding reduction, the next issue the court of appeals considered 
was the question of the ability of Maryland courts to remove offenders from 
“federal databases.”   
 
E. Removal from “Federal” Databases? 
 
     Pursuant to Doe I, the circuit courts for Washington County and Wicomico 
County directed the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services to 
remove Mr. Doe and Mr. Roe’s information from Maryland’s sex offender 
registration databases and website as well as “all federal databases including 
the NCIC.”174  Mr. Roe, in his response to the Department’s opposition to these 
orders, was partially correct to point out that there is no “federal registry.”175  
There is in fact no public federal sex offender registry—a nationwide 
collection of sex offender registration information is maintained by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation for law enforcement purposes only.176  These records, 
maintained as a component of the FBI’s National Crime Information Center 
(NCIC) database, are available to criminal justice agencies nationwide, which 
themselves enter the records.177  This compilation of sex offender registration 
information is not publicly available.  Since “NCIC policy requires the 
inquiring agency to make contact with the entering agency to verify the 
information is accurate and up-to-date[,] the agency where sex offender 
registration was initiated would be responsible for the updating and removal 
of that information from the NCIC.”178 
     Because the federal government by way of SORNA does not, and cannot, 
preempt the field of sex offender registration,179 the public national sex 
                                                                                                                             
register him, because the jurisdiction’s laws do not require registration for the 
offense of conviction.”) 
174 Doe II, 439 Md. at 210, 213, 94 A.3d at 796-98. 
175 Roe Response, supra note 137, at 18. 
176 The Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, 42 
U.S.C. § 14072, originally directed the Federal Bureau of Investigation to establish a 
national law enforcement database (the National Sex Offender Registry or “NSOR”) 
to track certain violent classes of sex offenders and those offenders convicted of an 
offense against a minor victim.  See Doe II, 439 Md.at 235-36, 94 A.3d at 811; 2008 
Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38032-33.  Although § 14072 has been repealed, 
SORNA continued the FBI’s National Sex Offender Registry intended for use by law 
enforcement only by incorporating the NSOR into the FBI’s National Crime 
Information Center (NCIC).  Doe II, 439 Md. at 235-36, 94 A.3d at 811; see also 42 
U.S.C. § 16919(a) (2013).  
177 Doe II, 439 Md. at 235-36, 94 A.3d at 811 (citing FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, National Crime Information Center, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ncic/ncic (last visited July 6, 2014)). 
178 Doe II, 439 Md. at 236, 94 A.3d at 811-12 (internal quotations omitted). 
179 See infra Part II.c. 
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offender registry is not a centralized database or registry at all.  The federal 
Dru Sjodin National Sex offender Public Website (NSOPW) provides that:  
 
NSOPW [does not] have a single national database of all 
registered sex offenders from the registry Jurisdictions that 
participate with NSOPW[.]  NSOPW primarily uses Web 
services to search the individual databases of the Jurisdictions 
in real time when a search is conducted.180  
 
The Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services has the 
responsibility to maintain, manage, and authorize termination of entries in the 
State’s central sex offender registry and to exchange information with federal 
agencies.181  Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that Maryland officials, 
by virtue of removing offenders from Maryland’s registry, also remove 
offender information from the NCIC database and NSOPW “search engine” 
results, eliminating law enforcement’s and the public’s ability to search for 
removed offenders at both the federal and state level.182  This indeed is a 
critical component of the alleviation of public shaming and shunning concerns 
expressed by the court of appeals in Doe I and by amicus.183   
     The court of appeals reviewed the language and scope of the court orders 
that directed the Department to remove offender information from state and 
federal databases.184  The court of appeals determined that the circuit courts’ 
orders in Mr. Doe and Mr. Roe’s cases were incorrect to the extent they 
ordered the Department to directly remove their information from “federal 
databases.”185  In so doing, the court, recognizing that removal from Maryland 
databases should in due course result in removal of the information from 
federal “databases,” instructed the court of special appeals to order the 
Department on remand only to “[r]emove any and all [offender] information . 
. . from the Maryland Sex Offender Registry website and any additional 
database(s) where the State has published such information, and notify all 
relevant federal agencies of the removal of Doe's information from Maryland's 
registry.”186     
                                                                                                                             
180 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Frequently Asked Questions: Using the NSOPW, 
http://www.nsopr.gov/en/Home/FAQ#answer-09 (last visited July 11, 2014). 
181 Doe II, 439 Md.at 237, 94 A.3d at 812 (citing MD. CODE REGS. 12.06.01.01-.18, 
12.06.01.08). 
182 Doe II, 439 Md. at 237, 94 A.3d at 812.  
183 See supra notes 87, 89-90 and accompanying text. 
184 Doe II, 439 Md. at 213, 94 A.3d at 798. 
185 Id. at 237-38, 94 A.3d at 812.  SORNA requires registering agencies and law 
enforcement entities to submit the information necessary to populate the National 
Sex Offender Registry Database utilized by law enforcement.   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 173, at 3. 
186 Doe II, 439 Md. at 238, 94 A.3d at 812-13.  As of November 1, 2014 DPSCS has 
begun the process of removing over 850 offenders from the State’s registry, and is 
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III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
     It is now clear that the Maryland constitution and the recent Court of 
Appeals of Maryland rulings preclude retroactive sex offender registration in 
Maryland, whether or not the State seeks to maintain substantial 
implementation of SORNA’s requirements.  Maryland is by no means alone 
in its historical struggle to substantially implement SORNA in pursuit of an 
important and just public policy in protecting minors, victims, and potential 
victims from violent sex offenders.  However, using SORNA’s federal 
standards as the focal point, most states have still failed to implement SORNA 
for a variety of reasons including state constitutionality problems, resistance 
to juvenile registration components, political will, and ex post facto 
retroactivity issues.187  Indeed, the Attorney General’s retroactivity analysis 
has proven to be fundamentally incompatible with an apparently growing 
number of states covered by SORNA.188  Below are some potential 
possibilities for Maryland to consider in legislating and administering 
                                                                                                                             
reviewing still more, following the Court of Appeals ruling in Doe II in June 2014.  
See DPSCS Press Release:  DPSCS begins removing offenders from Sex Offender 
Registry after the June Court of Appeals Ruling (Aug. 12, 2014), available at 
http://news.maryland.gov/dpscs/ 2014/08/12/dpscs-begins-removing-offenders-from-
sex-offender-registry-after-june-court-of-appeals-ruling/; Ian Duncan, Sun 
Investigates Court ruling upends Maryland's sex offender registry, BALTIMORE SUN 
(November 1, 2014) http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-sex-
offenders-20141101-story.html#page=1; A Shrinking Registry, BALTIMORE SUN 
(October 31, 2014, 4:11 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bal-sex-offender-registry-
graphic-10-31-2014-htmlstory.html. 
187 As of April 2015, only 17 states, three territories, and 83 Indian tribes have 
substantially implemented SORNA.  The final deadline following an extension was 
July 27, 2011.  See Jurisdictions that have substantially implemented SORNA, 
available at http://www.smart.gov/newsroom_jurisdictions 
_sorna.htm (last accessed April 8, 2015); Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety 
Act: Compliance news, NCSL, available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
civil-and-criminal-justice/adam-walsh-child-protection-and-safety-act.aspx (last 
accessed Dec. 18, 2014); Search Survey on State Compliance with the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) (April 2009) available at 
http://www.search.org/files/pdf/SORNA-StateComplianceSurvey2009.pdf (listing 
state-by-state reasons for failure to comply with SORNA).  This is a reduction from 
November 2012, at which time 19 of 56 jurisdictions had substantially implemented 
SORNA.  SEE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Report to 
the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Committee on the 
Judiciary, House of Representatives, Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act: 
Jurisdictions Face Challenges to Implementing the Act, and Stakeholders Report 
Positive and Negative Effects, at 13 (Feb. 2013) available at 
http://www.oregonlive.com/sexoffenders/special-
presentation/media/GAOsexoffenderFeb.2013reportSORNA.pdf. 
188 See infra Part III.a. 
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Maryland’s sex offender registration scheme moving forward in the wake of 
Doe I and Doe II.  
 
A. Should Maryland Abandon Substantial Implementation? 
 
     Many states face fiscal barriers and insufficient incentive to pursuing 
substantial implementation.189  Several states have publicly reported that the 
cost of substantially implementing SORNA is much greater than the cost of 
losing ten percent of its Byrne grant funds.190  For example, California officials 
have recommended that the state not pursue compliance with SORNA and 
instead “absorb the comparatively small loss of federal funds that would result 
from not accepting the very costly and ill-advised changes to state law and 
policy required by the [Adam Walsh] Act.”191  Similarly, Texas officials 
recently estimated that it would cost 38.7 million dollars to comply with 
SORNA, while the state would only lose 1.4 million dollars for failing to 
comply.192  In addition to fiscal considerations, Texas officials also expressed 
concern that SORNA’s offense-based classification system would improperly 
classify offenders and undermine the state’s work to individually assess 
offender risk in order to “narrow the sex offender registry to those who are 
most likely to be dangerous.”193   
     Colorado’s Sex Offender Management Board (SOMB) also recommended 
that the state not implement the requirements of SORNA, in part based upon 
a lack of evidence suggesting the effectiveness of SORNA’s standards.194  
                                                                                                                             
189 See, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INST., What Will it Cost States to Comply with the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act?, available at 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08-08_FAC_SORNACosts_JJ.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
190 Id. 
191 See STATE OF CAL. SEX OFFENDER MGMT. BD., Adam Walsh Act Statement of 
Position, 1-2 (2014), http://www.casomb.org/docs/Adam%20Walsh%20Position 
%20Paper.pdf. California elected to adopt a system assigning risk levels to 
individual offenders via actuarial risk assessment instruments as opposed to 
SORNA’s offense-based tier system.  Id. at 2. 
192 Donna Lyons, Sex Offender Law: Down to the Wire: June 2011, NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-
criminal-justice/sex-offender-law-down-to-the-wire.aspx#clash (last visited Dec. 18, 
2014).  
193 Id.  Similarly, “develop[ing] criteria for measuring a person's risk of reoffending 
to assist the court in determining whether a person may be appropriately released 
from [lifetime] supervision [pursuant to Maryland’s registration statute]” and 
“review[ing] the laws and practices of other states and jurisdictions concerning 
sexual offenders” are two of the tasks assigned to Maryland’s Sex Offender 
Advisory Board.  MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 1-401(g)(1) (2014). 
194 See COLO. SEX OFFENDER MGMT. BD., White Paper on the Adam Walsh Child 
Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 4 (September 2008), available at 
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However, the SOMB recommended some compromise, including “supporting 
efforts to enhance inter-jurisdictional communications relative to registrants” 
and continued participation in the law enforcement National Sex Offender 
Registry maintained by the FBI.195  Florida, too, has published virtually 
identical concerns with respect to its compliance with SORNA, noting that 
“[the Adam Walsh Act] has generated significant debate and controversy.”196  
Maine legislators also published a report with recommendations for a 
combination risk and offense-based revision of the state’s registration laws 
following the supreme judicial court’s finding in Letalien.197 
 
B. Fiscal Considerations in Implementation 
 
     The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) has pointed out the 
difficulty in assessing the cost of failing to implement SORNA based upon 
fluctuations in federal funding “during a time of deep recession and overall 
revenue and spending reductions.”198  In 2009, the exact cost of implementing 
SORNA-mandated retroactive registration in Maryland was unknown.  At that 
time the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services preliminarily 
projected the need to hire additional agents to supervise this retroactive class 
of offenders at an annual cost of $1,600 per offender and $50,000 in salary per 
new agent required for these low offender-agent ratios and specialized 
caseloads.199  Assuming conservatively that supervising Maryland’s 
retroactive class of approximately 1,250 offenders at a 1:15 agent to offender 
caseload ratio, this amounts to a cost of approximately 6.2 million dollars to 
supervise this population based upon those financial estimates.200  By the 
                                                                                                                             
http://www.opd.ohio.gov/AWA_Information/AWA_Colorado_SOMB_White%20Pa
per.pdf, for a discussion of this and other noted conflicts.  
195 Id.  Maryland’s Sex Offender Advisory Board is also mandated to “consider ways 
to increase cooperation among states with regard to sexual offender registration and 
monitoring.”  See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 1-401(g)(8). 
196 See THE FL. SENATE, Issue Brief 2009-312: Fiscal, Policy, and Legal 
Considerations Regarding State Compliance with the Adam Walsh Act, 1 (Oct. 
2008), http://www.ovsom.texas.gov/docs/Florida-Fiscal-Legal-Considerations-
AWA-2008.pdf. 
197 See State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 16 (Me. 2009); supra text accompanying note 
113; see also FINAL REP. OF THE CRIM. JUSTICE & PUB. SAFETY COMM., STUDY OF 
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION LAWS, 123d Leg., 2d Sess., at 18 (Me. Nov. 2008), 
available at http://www.maine.gov/legis/opla/sexoffender2008report.pdf 
(recommending in part a revision that does not strictly adhere to SORNA’s 
standards). 
198 Cost-Benefit Analyses of SORNA Implementation, NCSL, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/cost-benefit-analyses-of-
sorna-implementation.aspx (last visited Jul. 7, 2014).  
199 See Fiscal Note to S.B. 425 (Revised), 426th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 3 (Md. 
2009) (enacted as 2009 Md. Laws, ch. 541).   
200 See id.   
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NCSL’s calculation, in Fiscal Year 2012 Maryland would have lost only 
$622,500 of its $6,225,000 in Byrne funds for failure to substantially 
implement SORNA.201  As has been the experience of other states, it is very 
likely true that other costs associated with maintaining SORNA 
implementation in Maryland well exceed the loss of its Byrne funding.202  The 
cost to capture and supervise this retroactive class has proven to be 
substantially out of proportion with the grant funds allocated for this and other 
purposes. 
     Given the constitutionality issue under Maryland’s ex post facto 
constitutional prohibition, the costs of implementation experienced by 
Maryland and other states,203 and uncertain public safety benefits of SORNA 
implementation, Maryland regulators and lawmakers should consider 
abandoning efforts to substantially implement SORNA and carefully 
reevaluate sex offender registration requirements to ensure that only high-risk, 
dangerous offenders are required to register moving forward.204  Maryland is 
currently presented with this opportunity.   
     The Maryland Sexual Offender Advisory Board, formed in 2006, has 
existed prior to SORNA’s substantial implementation deadlines, and is an 
existing vehicle for such change.205  Although initially finding that the State’s 
compliance with SORNA has bolstered Maryland’s ability to “more accurately 
track and register convicted sex offenders, and to increase information sharing 
among jurisdictions[,]”206 the Board has more recently drafted legislation that 
would permit discharge of lifetime registrants from their lifetime registration 
                                                                                                                             
201 See SORNA Noncompliance Penalties, NCSL, available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/cj/jagstatedollars.pdf.  This is not to 
undermine the importance of Byrne funding to Maryland communities and a wide 
variety of Maryland criminal justice efforts it supports.  See also GOVERNOR’S 
OFFICE OF CRIME CONTROL & PREVENTION, FY 2014 Edward J. Byrne Memorial 
Justice Assistance (BJAG) Grant – Notice of Funding Available (NOFA) Application 
Guidance Kit, at 2-3, http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/grants/ 
2014/bjag/BJAG%20NOFA%20FY%2014.pdf (last accessed Dec. 18, 2014), for 
information on Maryland’s utilization of Byrne grant funds. 
202 It is important to note the persistent reduction of Byrne funding provided to 
Maryland within the past few years.  The 10% penalty reduced from $2.5 million in 
fiscal year 2010 to approximately $622,500 in fiscal year 2012.  See supra note 198, 
at 3.     
203 See supra Part III.a.   
204 The sentencing court in Mr. Doe’s 2006 criminal case in 2006 noted that it was 
impressed with Mr. Doe’s life, responsibility, and rehabilitative efforts since the sex 
offenses for which he was convicted. The court believed it unlikely that Mr. Doe 
would reoffend.  Doe I, 430 Md. at 539, 62 A.3d at 125.   
205 See MD. CODE, PUB. SAFETY § 1-401 (2013).     
206 MARYLAND SEXUAL OFFENDER ADVISORY BOARD, Report to the Governor and 
the Maryland General Assembly, at 6 (2011), available at 
http://dlslibrary.state.md.us/publications/Exec/DPSCS/PS1-401(h)_2011.pdf.  
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obligation based in part upon a risk assessment.207  While an immediate threat 
of the risk to public safety created in the wake of the recent Doe opinions is a 
tenable argument, the Board is well-equipped to address strategies to 
counteract this risk.208 
 
C. Reasonable Alternative Procedures or Accommodations 
 
     Should Maryland lawmakers and regulators choose to attempt to sustain 
substantial compliance in the wake of Doe I and Doe II, SORNA provides the 
standards of implementation.209  Maintaining substantial implementation in 
Maryland’s circumstance requires the “[U.S.] Attorney General and the 
jurisdiction [to] make good faith efforts to accomplish substantial 
implementation of this subchapter and to reconcile any conflicts between this 
subchapter and the jurisdiction’s constitution.”210  Further, the Attorney 
General “may determine that the jurisdiction is in compliance with this chapter 
if the jurisdiction has made, or is in the process of implementing reasonable 
alternative procedures or accommodations, which are consistent with the 
purposes of this chapter.”211   
     Maryland regulators and officials would need to work with the Attorney 
General in determining how, in light of Doe I and Doe II, the retroactivity 
component of SORNA’s applicability could be omitted while still 
                                                                                                                             
207 See id.  The proposed administrative process involves a risk assessment 
implemented by the Department’s Collaborative Offender Management/Enforced 
Treatment containment team.  Id.  However, the Board suggested in its 2011 report 
that it did not want to “risk losing its status as ‘substantially compliant’ with 
[SORNA].”  See id. at 33. 
208 For example, the Board could recommend that the Department incorporate 
screening for prior sex offenses into a tool utilized to actuarially assign increased 
supervision levels among current probationers and parolees.  This would bolster 
supervision requirements for pre-SORNA sex offenders who have re-entered the 
criminal justice system for non-sex offenses.  The Board could also examine other 
state’s statutes and policies for guidance.  
209 Theoretically, Maryland lawmakers could take a conservative approach such as 
re-codifying the sex offender registration scheme outside the Criminal Procedure 
Article, relaxing offender registration and community notification requirements, 
expressly stating a civil legislative purpose, or re-writing some of the registration 
statutes and procedures to avoid the punitive effects outlined in Doe I.  See, e.g., Doe 
I, 430 Md. at 573, 62 A.3d at 146 (Harrell, J., concurring) (“As long as a registration 
statute is tailored narrowly to prevent repetition of sex offenses and requires only 
qualifying sex offenders to register . . . it is not excessive in its deterrent purpose.”) 
(citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 103-04 (2003)).  A constitutional amendment of 
Article 17 to avoid the result in Doe I, while theoretically possible, is improbable. 
210 42 U.S.C. § 16925 (b)(2).  The Court of Appeals of Maryland discussed the effect 
§ 16925 of SORNA had on its opinion in Doe II.  439 Md. 201, 234, 94 A.3d 791, 
810. 
211 42 U.S.C. § 16925 (b)(3). 
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substantially implementing SORNA’s standards.212  Likewise, the Department 
of Public Safety and Correctional Services would have to scrutinize its 
implementation of SORNA and other regulations and policies in determining 
methods to sustain substantial implementation without retroactive 
application.213  However, SORNA and its retroactive implementation by the 
Attorney General remains the standard, despite the purely offense-based 
classification methodology that is being called into question in Maryland and 
other states.214  This represents a much larger problem for Congress and the 
Attorney General in legislating and implementing a federal policy, the 
effectiveness and propriety of which is being questioned on a national stage. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
 
     Maryland was deemed to have substantially implemented SORNA in 
Summer 2011 with the addition of certain required registration components.215  
However, Maryland policymakers are now faced with a decision following the 
court of appeals decisions in Doe I and Doe II regarding options for 
appropriate treatment and supervision of sex offenders convicted prior to the 
enactment of Maryland’s sex offender registration scheme.  Policymakers 
should closely examine other states’ decisions to abandon implementation of 
SORNA because of its legal, practical, and financial barriers to 
implementation.  Maryland has moved toward risk-based and efficient 
offender management techniques.216 Our state now has opportunity and 
                                                                                                                             
212 The Attorney General would also have to work with all other states with ex post 
facto and other state-constitutional problems in reconsidering the retroactive 
registration aspect of SORNA’s standards.  
213 In assessing compliance, the SMART Office will look at rules, administrative 
policies and procedures, and statutes.  2008 Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38047.  
214 “Applying such a broad-reaching statute like Maryland’s to any qualifying sex 
offender without particularized determinations of recidivism may undermine the 
law’s intent to prevent the repetition of sex offenses[.]  Indeed, recent research 
reports that broad-reaching sex offender registration and notification laws do not 
reduce recidivism by sex offenders.”  Doe I, 430 Md. at 573, 62 A.3d at 146 (Harrell, 
J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).  See also FINAL REP. OF THE CRIM. 
JUSTICE & PUB. SAFETY COMM., STUDY OF SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION LAWS, 
123d Leg., 2d Sess., at 18 (Me. Nov. 2008) (recommending a combined risk- and 
offense-based registration scheme), available at 
http://www.maine.gov/legis/opla/sexoffender2008report.pdf. 
215 MARYLAND SEXUAL OFFENDER ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 206, at 53.   
216 For example, Maryland’s Violence Prevention Initiative violent offender 
supervision strategy utilizes a risk-based assessment tool to intensely supervise high-
risk offenders and has been met with substantial success in reducing violent crime 
during the O’Malley administration.  See GOCCP Fact Sheet, Violence Prevention 
Initiative, available at http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/documents/VPI-Fact-
SheetB.pdf; Maryland DPSCS fact sheet: Keeping Communities Safe: Parole & 
Probation: Violence Prevention Initiative, GOCCP, available at 
http://www.dpscs.state.md.us/initiatives/one_sheets/VPI-One-Sheet-Feb-2010.pdf. 
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occasion to expand similar practices and strategies to the management of sex 
offenders within constitutional bounds and potentially without the assistance 
of the policy of the federal government. 
